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Is there a better subject than seduction? - Specially when talking about a special effect. 
So, I will start telling a story, a seduction-story of a young theologuc who had a fatal attraction 
for Descartes' most beloved Lady - I am obviously talking about Lady Philosophia. In the 
sevcnteenth century, philosophy was not a dry academic matter. Especially Descartes' new 
philosophy very cunningly offered herself as an irresistible temptation to ambitious theologues 
who hoped to save hard-pressed theology mcnaced by the conceptual tricks of widespread 
libertarians. Even if Descartes' Philosophy, after his death, was abhorred by catholic 
authorities as if it were the Babylonian \Xlhore in person, he has been receivcd, in the 
beginning, like a sacrosanct follower of Saint Augustine - for examplc by young Antoine 
Arnauld. Ile was the youngest son of an enormous and very catholic family and he was 
doomed to become one of the founders of one o f the most important religious movements of 
the scventeenth century. Attracted by Descartes' splendid mistress, he tried Oike Holy 
Augustine) to keep Lady Philosophia as an ancillary power of the catholic renewal of Port 
Royal - but finally he did not really succeed in resisting her tricks. But let's go over this story 
more slowly. 
ln 1640, he gets in touch with the manuscript of the Philosophical Meditations of 
Descartes thanks to the Father Mersenne. Enchanted with the task of commenting this text, 
Arnauld has to face a twofold problem: on tbe onc hand, he has to answer it as a philosopher, 
making use of his reason in metaphysical matters, on the other, he has to answer as a 
theologue, making clcar a theological position as to the entirely new use of reason proposed 
by Descartes. ln a general way, we might say, that the main problem consistcd in finding a 
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good, double-entry bookkceping system, which would make compatible a concomitant use of 
reason and of faith. This means, in the augustinian tradition, that reason has to be ancillary in 
relationship with faith, so that the latter might appear as a culmination of the further: theology 
being- of course- superior to philosophy. That's where the special effect comes in: the well-
knit augustinian system assuring a harmonious syntony of faith and reason is put to a test by 
Cartcsian philosophy and this test is staged in the form of an attraction - and a fmal seduction 
- of Antoine Arnauld. 
First act, first scene 
In 1640, the time he had his first contact with Descartes' philosophy, Arnauld writes a 
treatise called About Frequent Communion thanks to which he obtains the title of a Doctor. This 
treatise, considered one of the great treatises of catholic theology, is an essentially conservat:ive 
piece of theology. Its main task is to establish a link between any possible proposition and 
what has been revealed in the Bible, particularly in the New Testament, taking in all of the 
reformulations by the F athers o f the Church, the Saints and the Councils. According to it, 
what has been prescribed by faith is inconuptible; a Church, from thc doctrinal point of view, 
does not make mistakes, although it may be corruptible in its costumes and in its discipline. 
·validity of faith still remains absolute, even if there is concrete evidence of disorder. In 
theological matters it is quite enough to follow tradition, there is no need to explain empirical 
phenomen;>: explaining is a sort o f plague of modem times. 
Consequently, the existence of God is preliminarily acknowledged as given- as a sort 
of 'state of affairs', something that is present and offers itself to propositions, to knowledge-
but it exists of course only as a revealed truth. 
In this sense, reason starts from something already existing, from a kind of substance, 
which is the conclition of every statement relative to theological or metaphysical matters. In a 
way, it doesn't matter this concept o f revealed truth, bccausc, from a logical point of view, we 
have thc existence of something that is present. We can hcrc better measurc the distance in 
relationship to the Cartesian's philosophy. In this philosophy, the existence of the things in 
general is a problem; a problem that can be solved thanks the introduction of a new 
consideration of ideas, the existence of ideas. In the Augustinian traclition, God is not an 
object of analysis or interpretation, but of belief. So, in fact, Descartes really introduces a very 
serious special effect: he makes God become an idea of reason, something to be proved. 
But, how, in that case, can Arnauld deal with philosophy within his theological 
framework? How can we conceive the effect this beautifullady created over him? Even if his 
position is prudent in his book About frequent communion, it is nevertheless clear. He is against 
the hcretics and the Iibertarians, bccausc they use reason in ordcr to put everything into doubt. 
So they end up recognizing no limit at all. Consequently, if the theologue wants to fight 
against the heretics, he must use reason, thus exposing himself, as Hegel will say latter, to the 
cunning of reason. Perhaps, the organizers of this colloquium, when introducing the title 
"special effects", thought precisely about that effect o f cunning. 
Second act 
From this rather paradoxical concatenation of the principie of faith (revelation) with 
the principie of philosophical thought (reason and reasonable proof) derives a second effect, 
which is rather historical. Arnauld emboclies Cartesian philosophy and J ansenism. Both 
movements have their starting point in a critique of scholastic thought: it seems that the 
theological and moral reform of the Church depends on a revalorization of reason, which 
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implies a necessary substitution of Aristotelian and Thomist philosophy by Descartes'. But 
there is an interesting ambiguiry as to the "source of knowledge" envisaged by the two 
movements: one is looking for it in "Christian antiquiry", that is in the ''true Christian 
religion" o f thc first centuries, whereas the other, i. e. Cartesianism tries to find this source in 
rcason or in thc 'natural light'. Arnauld himself and bis fellow theologues got caught in this 
ambiguiry. 
Arnauld, as wall as his opponents, feel, in fact, ohliged to face the heretics, to rebut 
their arguments - producing, thus, a curious symbiosis between theology and philosophy. 
Philosophy, however, is invasive; it doesn't accept the limits imposed by faith and thus start 
tearing down its frontiers. Even if it is a good remedy against the heretics, philosophy remains 
what it always has heen a plague. lt produces, as a priest of that time said, "two bad effects in 
the spirits of the religious: em the one hand, an excessive desire of science, on the other, a 
distraction from prayer ". However, in a century invaded by libertarian habits, free thought 
and impious practices, which are considered as a sign of spiritual strength, the exerçise of 
philosophy still is a lesser cvil. 
The plague won. But it won in a rather special way. Philosophy won as if it were 
acting in an Augustinian way, as if reason were the serva..flt of faith. In the time of Descartes, 
there was a common opinion that the Cartesian philosophy took its roots in the thought of 
Saint Augustine. The "cogito", as we know, was not something invented by Descartes, but is 
already formulated by Saint Augustine, mainly in the T rinitate. In appcarancc, they work with 
the same principies, as lu:nauld rcmarkcd vcry clcarly. Nevertheless, the way both 
philosophers look for the proof o f the "same" principie, really is not the same. For instance, 
the Cartesian proof of the separation between mind and body is something that is apparently 
common to both rational metaphysics and the Christian metaphysics. The first edition of the 
lvf.etaphysicaf iVfeditations has the title: Metapbysicaf J'vfeditations, in 1Vbich the God's existence and the 
immorta!ity oJ the sou! are proved Once we may prove that the sou! is formally and really distinct 
from the body, the existence of one is not any more bound to the other. As a comequcnce, 
the body may be corruptible, but not the sou!. Reason would offcr to faith an instrument of 
convcrsion; an arm in thc battlcs of thought of a century which started with the libertinism of 
thought and which was followed the libertinism of the hody in the 18'h century. 
The paradoxical effect provoked by Cartesian metaphysics - hailed as a powerful 
instrument which might bring back to the Church the libertariam, the skeptics and the critics 
who became more and more importam within the Spirit of the Time - is precisely its 
becoming a catalyst of dissolution of religious convictions. The old servant of Faith turned 
out to be the powerful and dominating mistress of its most precious objects: God and the 
Sou!. 
Arnauld's conclusion in his Objectiom against the Medita/íons is particularly intcrcsting 
in this context, because at the same time he praiscs Descartes' devotion, he fears Cartesian 
philosophy "defending God's case agaimt impious libertarians" will put into their hands the 
arms "which might fight the faith founded by the authoriry o f the God he defends". On the 
one hand, reason; in its strong signification canned defend God's cause, proving His existence 
cvcn to the libertariam. ün the other hand, the same use of reason enables the enemy the 
instruments, which may undermine the foundations of faith. God becomes an idea and his 
existence an object of rational proof. However, Arnauld gives in to the seduction of this 
philosophy. Seven years after the first acquaintance the theologue thinks that the new 
philosophy is totally compatible with the principies of faith, and he approves of almost 
everything Descartes wrote concerning Pn-,na Pbifosophia. Arnauld is caught in the trap of 
reason; the God ofTradition becomes rhe God of philosophers. 
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Last act 
In 1662, together with Pierre Nicole, Amauld publishes the Logic of Port Royal. This is 
12 years after the death of Descartes, 18 years after his first acquaintance with Descartes' 
writings and only a few years before the work of the philosopher are put on the index o f the 
Church. The Logic of Port Royal is a sort o f Cartesian Organon o f the XVIIth century, which was 
supposed to substitute Aristotle's Organon. It continued, up to the XIXth century, as an 
important propagator of Cartesian philosophy. As the title shows, theology is not thc main 
object of this work. We find in it rather a logical and grammatical approach of Eucharist, 
which is highly interesting. Lct's look at it more closcly, bcginning with the distinction 
between divine and human nature: 
Men being made of body and sou!, they depend on meaning in order to communicate. 
Consequently, there is a shared convention as to the use of certain signs, which arousc in 
diffcrcnt pcrsons the same thoughts. These thoughts are either ideas methodically elaborated 
by the thinking substance, or thoughts transmitted by revealed truth. Once thought is always 
accompanied by words which are necessaty for our communication with other persons; once 
finitc racional and corporal beings in their relationship have to fali back on exterior signs 
which are not exclusively intellectual but also sensitive. For thosc gcntlcmcn, rcflection about 
thought comes together with a reflection about language; logic is accompanied by grammar. 
Adopting an Aristotelian distinction, Arnauld distinguishes between an internai discourse, 
proper for demonstration or elaboration of ideas which is, in that sense, incontestable, and an 
externai discourse, concerned with thc communication and persuasion. It is in the external 
world that we are exposed to ambiguities and misunderstandings provoked by clifferent 
meanings attributed to the words, whercas thc internai world is mainly occupied with the 
deduction of ideas. 
Conccrning the idea of a thing, we consider the object in itselt~ in its own being, 
"without having the mind's eye look at what it might represent (Arnauld, Logic, I, VI), which 
would be the case, for examplc, with thc idca o f the earth o r the sun. Concerning the idea o f a 
sign, on the contrary, we consider a certain object as something which represents something 
else. This object is called sign (i. e. pictures or maps) and consequently comprehends two ideas 
- the idea of the thing it reprcsents and thc idea of the thing represented: that means, it 
specifies that the idea of the thing represented is aroused or excited by the idea of thc thing 
it rcpresents. 
H Thing or Object in itself I 
Sign H represented object or thing I 
'-----------' 
The linguistic concerns of Port Royal is strictly philosophical, they deal with the ways of 
exarnining our access to the ideas. The question is how to opera te a sort o f division o f ideas in 
a way which assures that meaning of the rcprcscntcd thing in a proper sit,'ll is founded on the 
doctrine o f ideas and judgement. That is why Arnauld and Nicole insist on the necessity o f an 
investigation, which pays attcntion to the "particular nature of the sign"1 The linguisric 
concern, however, unfolds in to a theological one, beca use the real presencc o f J csus Christ in 
thc Eucharistic mystcry can bc conceivcd only in function of the 'particular nature of the sign': 
the sign being simultaneously thing and representation. 
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In fact, one might say that the polemics of thc Gcntlcmen o f Port Royal with the 
Protestants are based on the way thcy conccivc the sign. In the protestant interpretation, the 
Eucharistic bread is a figurative rcprcscntation of the Christ: bread as well as Christ are 
conceived as two real ideas, one is takcn as rcprcscnting the other in a figurative way. The 
Protestants have thus a particular conception of the sign. The sign is valid for the meaning of 
thc things o f the externa!, finite world in general, subjected to temporality, but valid also to 
signify the body of the Christ, and that means, a "body" whose naturc is divine and eterna!, 
according to revealed truth. 
In the protestant conception, bread is, at one time, an cmpirical object, at another 
time, the figura tive representation o f an immaterial, divinc body. 
(Let me just say that our own, modem conception tends to bc closer to the protestant 
one, since we tend to have a representational concept of meaning. But wc are free to chose, 
adopting, for example, the conception of the late Wittgenstein, wherc thc meaning depeneis on 
the intencional use- and then we come dose again to thc conccption o f Port Royal) 
So let me go deeper into thc disagrccment between Port Royal and the Protestants: 
According to Arnauld, the Rucharistic hread is a tlung which is, at the same time, and not in 
two successive moments or states, thing anel sign. This theological play around revelation is 
hinged on a particular form of prcscnce- present in time -, although subtracted to time. This 
means, philosophically spcaking, that the Cartesian theory of ideas is theologically embedded 
in a form o f justification of thc prcsence o f the Christ - thanks to a 'racional' grammar, which 
thus reveals its thcological marks. 
Thus, the words o f Jesus Chris "This is my body" represent, for Arnauld, a clcar and 
distincr proposition signified by the use o f precisely those words, which excite or arousc an 
idca in thc spirit of the listener. Consequently, one must not add to it ideas which are not 
includcd in this proposition - for example, ideas emerging from a confusion conccrning the 
mcanings of certain words in certain propositions. "This is my body" uses "bread" as a sign, 
which arouses the idea of a divine, incorporeal body, not the empirical catablc objcct bread. 
\\!e must not forget that the adequare comprehension of the mcaning of these words 
presupposes rhe truth of t!Us proposition as revealed truth This is thc condition of 
intelligibility of this proposition, which has a specific contcxt of cnunciation, within which the 
intention o f the speaker in front o f his listener plays an important role. 
For instance, in the case of the demonstrative pronoun "this" (hoc) appears, alrhough 
in a confused way, the idea o f thc thing present, because the idea o f bread is not "precisely 
mcant by this tcrm"2, but it is only "stirred/aroused/excited". Arnauld pays particular 
attcnüon to a distincüon - which is not recognized by the Protestants - between the 'excited 
ideas' and the 'precisely meant ideas'. 'Ibe bread, in this particular theological use, belongs to 
the first kind o f idea, whereas the Christ's body belongs to the second onc. 
Empirically speaking, the bread is only thc occasion of the meaning and, 
consequently, of the intellection of thc (immatcrial, divine) body of the Christ. The problem 
to be solved is "how did the [Apostles] conccivc Him", how can we translate the Apostle's 
revelation into the linf.,>uistic-theological mies of a logically valid conception. In this 
pcrspcctivc, thc pronoun "this" is the confused idea of the present thing, the "bread" the 
aroused or stirred idea (occasional and dependant on the circumstances), the "Christ's body" 
is the meant idea. Thus, the distinct idea o f "bread" is not meant by the use o f thc pronoun 
"this". 
Arnauld's analysis shows a very important difference from thc protcstant Minister's 
conception: they consider that "this" is the bread - more clearly it is not real!y the body of the 
Christ, but only figurative!y'. In that conception the whole Eucharistic mystery of thc 
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 proposition dissolves in the representational meaning: "This is figuratively [the representation 
ofj my body". 
Arnauld's opposition against this conception is based on a very subtle logical 
distinction between two types of incidental propositions: incidental explica tive propositions, 
on the one hand, incidental determinative propositions on the other. (I apologize for the 
rather difficult technical aspects I will have to expose in arder to get to my flnal - and 
theologically most exciting- special effect). Let's see the two typcs flrst: 
a) Incidental explicative propositions add terms, which do not alter the idea of the subject, 
they explicit what is included in an idea without restricting its essential properties. They 
are appropriate for theological propositions like: "The men who have been created in 
order to know and lave God"3 
b) Incidental detenninative propositions restrict the extension of the subject, thus 
determining its meaning. For example, the proposition: "The men who are pious" 
determines only a ccrtain number o f mcn, not humanity as a whole 
It may happen, however, that the determina tive element (the relative pronoun "who" or "that 
which") of the incidental proposition does not afflrm anything relative to the subject implied 
by "who" or "that which". Arnauld show this analyzing the role of the incidental proposition 
in the Eucharistic formula "This is my body". This formula implies an ostensive definition 
evoking (along with "This") an implicit determinative element: "which is the bread". 
However, this element is only implicd and not affirmed of thc pronoun "this", because this 
pronoun is the subject of the attribute "my body", meaning the Christ's body, as we can 
abolish the determinative proposition without changing the meaning of the whole 
proposition. 
Arnauld and Nicole observe very subtly that our judgement of the nature of these 
propositions (in order to flnd out whether they are explicative or determinative) depends 
entirely on the attention we pay to the meaning and the intention of the speaker. Wc can have 
access to the truth -of a proposition, theological propositions included, only supposing that 
those who proffer them determine the mcaning and the intention. In other words, the 
meaning o f the Eucharistic proposition depcnds on the meaning and the intention o f Jesus 
Christ at the moment he pronounced it. 
Corning back to the dispute betwecn Arnauld and the Protestant Ministers we can see 
now the truly stunning solution proposcd by his logic-linguistic analysis. Arnauld shows that it 
werc the Apostles (not Christ) who detcrmined the idea of the thing present as being the 
bread. But this, according to Arnauld, does not exclude another determination, which may 
have cscaped the attention of the Christ's listeners. As the Christ's proposition is based on 
revealed truth, the Apostles (or any of their readers) may subtract what they added: the bread 
is, ·.in fact, an incidental determinative proposition, which can be cut out without the least 
alteration to the truth of the main proposition. This one talks about the idea of the Christ's 
body together with the "thing present", whose presence is situated in the represcntation o f the 
one who conceives. 
Arnauld reveals to his readers thc indeed very spccial effect produced by the Christ's 
words- an effect that escaped, however, the attention of the Apostles! 
Notas 
' Ibid, I, IV. 
' Ibid., I . XV. 
' Ibid. li, VI. 
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